Flawed Search for a Better Marine Rucksack

[thedrifter]

02-02-2004

Flawed Search for a Better Marine Rucksack







By Matthew Dodd



As a career Marine officer, I am very familiar with the myth and reality of the adage, ?Marines have been doing more with less for so long that they feel they can do anything with nothing forever.?



But that?s no excuse for failing to correct faulty equipment, as the following account of Marine Corps efforts to acquire an effective combat rucksack reveals.



We are on the verge of a major deployment of Marines to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II). The Marine Corps Times on Dec. 15 published an article raising serious concerns that Marines may not be getting the best rucksack to replace the inferior pack that failed miserably in combat in Afghanistan. Given the inherent risks of this pending deployment to Iraq, and what is at stake in Iraq and the rest of the world based on the success of OIF II, now is not the time to test the validity that adage.



The Times article opened with:



?Compare the new rucksack you?re getting early next year to the maligned [Modular, Lightweight, Load-carrying Equipment] MOLLE pack that failed Marines in combat, and it sure looks like a winner. But in the rush to replace your ruck without breaking the bank, the Corps pushed aside a contender that fared better in testing and won the favor of fleet Marines.?



Anyone familiar with the military-designed MOLLE pack understands why the Corps needed a new pack. For starters, it was so complicated it required an instructional video to put it together! Then, in Afghanistan in 2001, some units experienced external frame breakage rates as high as fifteen percent. In the summer of 2002, the Corps decided the MOLLE pack had to go, and mandated a new replacement pack within a year.



Understanding the process used to test, evaluate, and finally select a replacement pack is essential, the Marine Corps Systems Command (SysCom) went to the commercial market and reviewed a dozen different packs before focusing in on two finalists (I will call them ?A? and ?B?). SysCom decided to use the MOLLE as a baseline with which to compare ?A? and ?B.?



Approximately 2,400 packs of both types were tested (approximately 800 packs apiece to Camp LeJeune, N.C., Camp Pendleton, Cal., and to Okinawa and Hawaii with operational units). When those forces deployed to Iraq, the packs went with them for a combat test.



Marines evaluated the packs in 25 performance criteria. Marine evaluators gave rucksack ?A? an 87 percent rating, and a 96 percent rating for ?B.? Of the 92 questions answered by Marine testers, ?B? came out ahead in 73 questions, ?A? came out ahead in 16 questions, and in 3 questions testers favored either both ?A? and ?B? or the MOLLE pack. SysCom released the results last July 14.



A SysCom memo six days earlier, on July 8, 2003, raised eight concerns with ?A,? and five with ?B.? Officials informed both companies of those concerns, but they were not directed specifically on how to address them. The companies submitted revised packs for final evaluation.



At this point in the process, everything seemed logical and straightforward. Both ?A? and ?B? were unquestionably superior to the MOLLE pack, and Marine testers strongly favored ?B? over ?A.?



Here is where other factors began to exert influence and where serious questions about the Marine Corps acquisition process began to emerge.



The revised submissions surprised many involved with the selection process. ?A? was definitely improved into what I will call the ?A+? pack. ?B? was significantly redesigned but Marine evaluators said it was actually inferior to the initial ?B? model. The Times quoted Capt. David Pinion, officer in charge of the MOLLE replacement project through the selection phase:



?Their final proposal was very, very different from what we tested and had some significant weaknesses in it. [?B?] was at the one-yard line. All they had to do was walk this thing in, but they fumbled.?



I call the revised ?B? pack the ?B-? pack to reflect that it was worse than the original attempt.



Looking at the ?A+? and ?B-? packs as final submissions, the selection group of Marines ? from different backgrounds and commands ? considered the operating forces? field evaluations along with biometrics testing and price in making their decisions. The group unanimously selected the ?A+? pack to replace the MOLLE pack.



I can understand from a competitive business or acquisition perspective what normal final evaluations mean. However, the Marine in me tells me that the final evaluation and ultimate selection were anything but normal.



At the time of final submissions, it was obvious that something was wrong. No company deliberately ruins its chances at a $50 million-plus government contract, especially after leading the competition handily and being poised to score the clinching touchdown from the ?one-yard line.?



In a letter to The Marine Corps Times on Dec. 22, SysCom project manager for infantry combat equipment Lt. Col. G.R. Patricio wrote, ?[O]ne company hit the bull?s eye; the other did not.? He also defended the process, stated that both companies had an equal opportunity to address issues that Marines had raised during the process leading up to the final evaluation, and justified the final decision of the replacement pack:



?The selected company had the highest technical rated proposal and the best price; in a ?best value? acquisition process, this is a slam-dunk. In fact, we could not have defended awarding the other way (the pack not selected was approximately $16 million more and was not rated as highly as the one selected in the final evaluation).?



Here is my analysis of the process and the decision:



First of all, we recently sent Marines into combat with a combat-ineffective pack (MOLLE). The worst part about that fact is that I am sure it came as no surprise to the troops who have had to live with that inferior pack over the last few years. Sadly, it took actual failures in actual combat situations for senior leaders to acknowledge what was already common knowledge among the troops. An editorial in the Marine Corps Times said it best:



?But after MOLLE?s double failure, this isn?t about ?the best pack for the best price? anymore. It?s about restoring Marines? faith in their gear.?



Second, the operating forces that will be taking the replacement pack into combat tested the packs and provided their feedback and evaluations of the two finalists, in both training and combat environments. The results were lopsided in favor of the pack not selected. The same Marines who tested the packs will now be getting the pack they evaluated as second-best in a two-pack test. Despite what the ?duty-experts? at SysCom say about the selected pack, I believe it will fail to restore Marines? faith in their gear. That failure is inexcusable in a combat situation.



Third, did anyone involved with the final evaluation stop to think about the above two points, or were they just relieved to have a ?slam-dunk? presented to them to make an easy decision and stick to their mandated deadline? Did anyone bother to find out how the manufacturers of ?B? could completely sabotage their own apparent slam-dunk to ?snatch defeat from the jaws of victory??



Fourth, the one-year deadline to find a replacement pack seems decisive and reasonable ? at least on the surface. We are talking about replacing a proven combat failure well into our indefinite global war on terrorism. If that scenario is not enough to inspire Marines involved with the pack replacement process to develop a bias for action, then they are not worthy of the title ?Marine.?



The senior officer behind the summer 2002 decision to push for a new pack within a year was the deputy commandant for plans, policies, and operations, Lt. Gen. Emil R. ?Buck? Bedard. He stepped down from that position last summer and officially retired on Dec. 1.



Given the high-level interest in the timeline for a replacement pack, and the domineering personality behind the timeline, one has to wonder whether the selection group even considered requesting more time to investigate the circumstances that led to the final evaluation?s ?reverse slam-dunk.? In a perfect world, the ultimate goal of fielding a replacement pack should be to select the absolute best pack available. That goal is drastically different from the goal of selecting the best pack within a prescribed timeline.



If the selection group did not request more time, someone needs to ask, ?Why?? If the selection group requested more time, someone needs to find out at what level the group?s request was denied, and then again ask, ?Why??



Once we can understand the selection group?s ultimate goal and the support of the group?s chain of command for its goal, the following quote from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command?s pack requirements officer, Capt. David Hunt, can be put into its proper context:



?Bedard?s timeline, while ambitious, was absolutely doable. I didn?t know it was doable until after it was over, but it was doable.?

Lastly, the final evaluation considered operating forces? field evaluations, biometrics testing, and price. As noted earlier, the ?B? pack was dominantly favored over the ?A? pack in field evaluations, but the ?A+? and ?B-? packs were never field-tested by Marines. The biometrics testing was neutral between the packs. In terms of price, the ?A+? pack costs approximately $355. The ?B-? pack costs approximately $453, including a nuclear, biological and chemical environment compatible water hydration system that the ?A+? does not. Understanding the selection group?s ultimate goal and the support of the group?s chain-of-command for its goal will show how the three evaluation criteria were weighed or prioritized.



I expect that Marines will always strive to do more with less, especially in combat. Deliberately giving them fewer capabilities when it comes to available gear and relying on them to compensate for known lesser gear capabilities by doing more is simply not acceptable.



Still, I wonder why the company that had submitted a superior ?B? rucksack was not given the chance to correct its redesign to provide Marines with the superior product.



I sincerely hope that time will prove that the replacement pack process and selection was not as questionable as my analysis has led me to believe.



Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd USMC is a Senior Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.

http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/....31436291079674

Sempers,

Roger