Ted Goes Infantry

Ted wrote:

"In 1966-1967, NO infantry unit in the 3d Brigade, 1st Cav went beyond the range
of arty support. None. It was policy, and it was adhered to."

Ted does not know this for a fact. Ted read this in a book. Ted likes to read
books. Ted believes everything that he reads (assuming that he likes the
author).
I am going to send Ted a nice book and a box of crayons. Do remember to stay in
the lines, Ted.

>Subject: Ted Goes Infantry
>From: Alligator Al Alligator_member@newsguy.com
>Date: 9/12/2003 7:00 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id:
>
>Ted wrote:
>
>"In 1966-1967, NO infantry unit in the 3d Brigade, 1st Cav went beyond
>the range of arty support. None. It was policy, and it was adhered to."

>
>Ted does not know this for a fact. Ted read this in a book.


Or perhaps being in the artillery and all he was familiar with Brigade policy
on artillery coverage and stuff like that. Or perhaps he was involved in
moving guns around to ensure that the infantry were covered at all times. Just
a guess on my part of course.

They never had to move the artillery to keep us under their umbrella but this
was mostly due to the fact that it was just damn hard to keep those tracks
operating on those 60% slopes. So we were a bit restricted as to where we
roamed.

But I have set in the 196th LIB staff meetings while they made plans to move
some of the artillery so that their infantry units would be covered. It was,
as the man said, policy and it was adhered to.

Try this one on for size hotshot. Our 1st and 3rd platoon was working together
down in the Pineapple and in one of our worse days we lost both medics. Higher
called down and told us to hold in place until replacement medics could be
choppered out.

All of which indicates the importance higher placed on us having artillery and
medical support for us. It was an importance not missed by those of us on the
ground.

Bill Clarke

On 12 Sep 2003 1320 GMT, fatmane@aol.com (FatmanE) wrote:

>>Subject: Ted Goes Infantry
>>From: Alligator Al Alligator_member@newsguy.com
>>Date: 9/12/2003 7:00 AM Central Daylight Time
>>Message-id:
>>
>>Ted wrote:
>>
>>"In 1966-1967, NO infantry unit in the 3d Brigade, 1st Cav went beyond
>>the range of arty support. None. It was policy, and it was adhered to."
>
>>
>>Ted does not know this for a fact. Ted read this in a book.
>
>
>Or perhaps being in the artillery and all he was familiar with Brigade policy
>on artillery coverage and stuff like that. Or perhaps he was involved in
>moving guns around to ensure that the infantry were covered at all times. Just
>a guess on my part of course.
>
>They never had to move the artillery to keep us under their umbrella but this
>was mostly due to the fact that it was just damn hard to keep those tracks
>operating on those 60% slopes. So we were a bit restricted as to where we
>roamed.
>
>But I have set in the 196th LIB staff meetings while they made plans to move
>some of the artillery so that their infantry units would be covered. It was,
>as the man said, policy and it was adhered to.
>
>Try this one on for size hotshot. Our 1st and 3rd platoon was working together
>down in the Pineapple and in one of our worse days we lost both medics. Higher
>called down and told us to hold in place until replacement medics could be
>choppered out.
>
>All of which indicates the importance higher placed on us having artillery and
>medical support for us. It was an importance not missed by those of us on the
>ground.
>
>Bill Clarke
>
>
>
I think the higher ups always tried to keep us within radio contact,
and within the reach of fire support, but just being within range
doesn't always help. Once in the Plei Trap valley we couldn't get any
support, as mortars were unable to help, I think we were within range,
but I believe they were out of rounds, air couldn't help as we had
used up all our smoke the day before, so we expected art'y to do the
trick. But, even though we were within range, there seemed to be a
mountain in the way. To top things off, a tree had fallen on our M-60
the day before and it jambed. Thank God for 1st platoon coming to our
rescue.
http://cpcug.org/user/jlacombe/tom.html

On Fri, 12 Sep 2003 1446 GMT, tlacombe@shentel.net (Tom Lacombe)
wrote:

>To top things off, a tree had fallen on our M-60
>the day before and it jambed. Thank God for 1st platoon coming to our
>rescue.

This point makes me ask again why the infantry platoon did not have more
heavy automatic weapons?



Regards Ralph

" The willingness with which our young people are likely to serve in any
war, no matter how justified, shall be directly Proportional to how they
perceive the Veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their
Nation"
George Washington

In article <3f61d555.14063278@news.shentel.net>, Tom Lacombe says...
>
>On 12 Sep 2003 1320 GMT, fatmane@aol.com (FatmanE) wrote:
>
>>Try this one on for size hotshot. Our 1st and 3rd platoon was working together
>>down in the Pineapple and in one of our worse days we lost both medics. Higher
>>called down and told us to hold in place until replacement medics could be
>>choppered out.
>>
>>All of which indicates the importance higher placed on us having artillery and
>>medical support for us. It was an importance not missed by those of us on the
>>ground.
>>
>>Bill Clarke
>>
>>
>>
>I think the higher ups always tried to keep us within radio contact,
>and within the reach of fire support, but just being within range
>doesn't always help. Once in the Plei Trap valley we couldn't get any
>support, as mortars were unable to help, I think we were within range,
>but I believe they were out of rounds, air couldn't help as we had
>used up all our smoke the day before, so we expected art'y to do the
>trick. But, even though we were within range, there seemed to be a
>mountain in the way. To top things off, a tree had fallen on our M-60
>the day before and it jambed. Thank God for 1st platoon coming to our
>rescue.
>http://cpcug.org/user/jlacombe/tom.html

When our Company was air lifted into Cambodia in hot pursuit of a large NVA
force that was spotted in the area, our battalion commander had us split our
Company up. We walked back into Vietnam and despite signs that the large NVA
force were everywhere and the fact that they tried to probe our perimeter during
the night, our battalion commander held one complete Company back at a fire base
scratching their asses and our First Platoon over 1000 meters away from the
Third Platoon and the Second Platoon about 400 to 500 meters away chasing the
bad guys into an ambush. One squad from the Third Platoon left the platoon to
walk back to the fire base.
What was Higher's reasoning? It is all written in General SLA Marshall's book,
"West To Cambodia." To put it bluntly we were put out against a superior force
as bait because our colonel had not had success in getting in a good fight
despite his insistence that we stayed out in the field month after month until
we got into one. The result was our platoon (Third Platoon) was wiped out and
the half of the second platoon. The First Platoon arrived too late and the
squad made it back to the firebase.
The after-action report states the same but the lieutenant who wrote it didn't
dare place the blame on Colonel Siegriest as Gen Marshall did.
When I was in the 173rd, they used similar tactics - deploying small units -
separated far apart to search and destroy known much larger units, and I got
involved in one of those also. The result was the 173rd has the distinction of
losing more men in one Company in one day in the entire war.
Those are cold hard facts but I'll be called a Commie son-of-a-bitch stupid
motherfucker, etc., etc., etc... for even suggesting that some of our "highers"
didn't give a rat's ass about us.
Ya can't squeeze apple juice out of a turnip and these guys are going to believe
what they want to believe despite the facts.
They've lied to each other for so many years, I think they are in permanent
denial of anything regarding the Vietnam war...

On Fri, 12 Sep 2003 1611 GMT, Ralph
buddyb@yippi.ti.ye wrote:

>On Fri, 12 Sep 2003 1446 GMT, tlacombe@shentel.net (Tom Lacombe)
>wrote:
>
>>To top things off, a tree had fallen on our M-60
>>the day before and it jambed. Thank God for 1st platoon coming to our
>>rescue.
>
>This point makes me ask again why the infantry platoon did not have more
>heavy automatic weapons?

Its called humping. Food, water, ammo, extra batteries, hostile
terrain, you name it. If it was in the field, most of it had to be
carried by someone unless you had a lot of choppers and could count on
them in all weather, all terrain. I don't know about everyone else,
but we sure couldn't.

On Fri, 12 Sep 2003 17:53:18 GMT, Patrick t.
wrote:

>On Fri, 12 Sep 2003 1611 GMT, Ralph
>buddyb@yippi.ti.ye wrote:
>
>>On Fri, 12 Sep 2003 1446 GMT, tlacombe@shentel.net (Tom Lacombe)
>>wrote:
>>
>>>To top things off, a tree had fallen on our M-60
>>>the day before and it jambed. Thank God for 1st platoon coming to our
>>>rescue.
>>
>>This point makes me ask again why the infantry platoon did not have more
>>heavy automatic weapons?
>
>Its called humping. Food, water, ammo, extra batteries, hostile
>terrain, you name it. If it was in the field, most of it had to be
>carried by someone unless you had a lot of choppers and could count on
>them in all weather, all terrain. I don't know about everyone else,
>but we sure couldn't.
>
Pat's right. There is only so much you can carry. You already have
lots of guys carrying M-60 ammo to keep that one gun well supplied.
If you were in a position where you didn't have to carry all that
stuff, more 60's would be great.
http://cpcug.org/user/jlacombe/tom.html

> To put it bluntly we were put out against a superior force
>as bait because our colonel had not had success in getting in a good fight
>despite his insistence that we stayed out in the field month after

dino,

Quit your whinning. They used us as bait too. WTF, that's what we were there
for; lure the enemy out and blow the bastards away. There were a couple of
guys in my unit that had the same complaint, "we're nothing but bait". Whatever
worked was OK with me. Sure, we ran into larger forces (not superior) and
waiting in the wings was a monster big dog (support) that backed us up and we
chewed the NVA/VC up.

I'm getting a feeling you weren't/aren't cut out for this kinda stuff. Sure, it
was gawdamn risky/dicey business, but we never lost more than 10 men (KIA) in
any one day/engagement. We clobbered those bastards from one end of our AO to
the other.
dino, engaging in war is risky, unfair, ruthless, no holds barred, do what
you've got to do business. Why are you whinning? Were you expecting a picnic?

- LMAO

Greg

>Subject: Re: Ted Goes Infantry
>From: Ralph buddyb@yippi.ti.ye
>Date: 9/12/2003 11:32 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id:
>
>On Fri, 12 Sep 2003 1446 GMT, tlacombe@shentel.net (Tom Lacombe)
>wrote:
>
>>To top things off, a tree had fallen on our M-60
>>the day before and it jambed. Thank God for 1st platoon coming to our
>>rescue.
>
>This point makes me ask again why the infantry platoon did not have more
>heavy automatic weapons?
>
>
>
> Regards Ralph
>
Me either Ralph. I never left home without at least 25 of those wonderful
50.cal MGs.

Bill Clarke

>Subject: Re: Ted Goes Infantry
>From: Alligator Al Alligator_member@newsguy.com
>Date: 9/12/2003 11:57 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id:
>
>Ya can't squeeze apple juice out of a turnip and these guys are going
>to believe what they want to believe despite the facts.
>They've lied to each other for so many years, I think they are in
>permanent denial of anything regarding the Vietnam war...
>
>

But you have to remember that not only are you unique (to put it nicely) but
evidently so were the numerous units that you were assigned to as well as your
vietnam experience.

All very unique.

Bill Clarke