Plan Colombia

Colombia is in the midst of a decades-long conflict, pitting the government against two leftist insurgencies and a right-wing paramilitary organization. Colombia's 38-year civil war claims more than three-thousand lives a year. The country's largest guerrilla group, the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia are involved in the drug trade to raise money for their fight. A smaller leftist rebel group, the National Liberation Army, relies on kidnapping and extortion for its funding. The United States has labeled all three groups as terrorist organizations.

An alliance of convenience between guerillas and traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970s, drug traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary alliances of convenience with leftist guerillas, or with right wing groups. In each case, this has been done to secure protection for the drug interests. At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies to provide security services. Some insurgent and paramilitary groups have, in fact, become little more than bands of well-armed thugs selling their services to drug traffickers.

The presence of the insurgents in Colombia's eastern lowlands and southern rainforest--the country's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions--hinders the Colombian Government's ability to conduct counterdrug operations. The frequent ground fire sustained by Colombian National Police eradication aircraft operating in insurgent occupied areas shows the extent to which some insurgent units will go to protect the economic interests of their "local constituents" (i.e., coca farmers and drug traffickers). Likewise, insurgent attacks continue to pose a threat to CNP personnel, supported by the DEA conducting operations, against clandestine labs.

Although the FARC-controlled safe haven, or "despeje" -- which is situated between two of Colombia's largest coca cultivation areas -- is not considered a major area for coca cultivation or drug trafficking, many FARC units throughout southern Colombia raise funds through the extortion ("taxation") of both legal and illegal businesses, the latter including the drug trade. Some insurgent units raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations. In return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons, the insurgents protect cocaine laboratories in southern Colombia. Some FARC and ELN units are independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations. Some FARC units in southern Colombia are reported to be directly involved in drug trafficking activities, such as controlling local cocaine base markets.

The National Liberation Army (ELN) operates primarily along Colombia's northeastern border with Venezuela and in central and northwestern Colombia. The territories under ELN influence include cannabis and opium poppy growing areas. Some ELN units raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations. Some ELN units may be independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations, but the ELN appears to be much less dependent than the FARC on coca and cocaine profits to fund its operations. The ELN expresses a disdain for illegal drugs, but does take advantage of the profits available where it controls coca producing areas.

The United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) umbrella group, which includes many Colombian paramilitary forces, admittedly uses the cocaine trade to finance its counterinsurgency campaign. The head of the AUC, Carlos Castano, stated in 2000 that "70 percent" of AUC operational funding was from drug money and described it as an undesired but necessary evil. AUC elements appear to be directly involved in processing cocaine and exporting cocaine from Colombia.

Some insurgent units apparently have assisted drug trafficking groups in transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia. In particular, some insurgent units protect clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia. There was, however, no information as of 2000 that any FARC or ELN units had established international transportation, wholesale distribution, or drug money laundering networks in the United States or Europe. Northern and central Colombia continues to be the primary base of operations for paramilitary groups. Recent reporting, however, indicated that paramilitary groups have become more active in southern Colombia.

Most of these paramilitary groups do not appear to be directly involved in any significant coca, opium poppy, or marijuana cultivation. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano admitted, however, that his group receives payments -- similar to the taxes levied by the FARC -- from coca growers in southern Colombia to protect them from guerrillas, according to press reporting.

Several paramilitary groups also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Castano organization, and possibly other paramilitary groups, appear to be directly involved in processing cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary groups appears to be involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia.

The Clinton and Bush Administrations, and the Congress, expressed concern about the connection between the FARC and other groups in Colombia and the drug trade. The Colombian government has engaged in responding to this challenge.

The United States is providing more than one-billion dollars in aid, most of it in military equipment and training, to help the Colombian military combat drug trafficking and the armed groups that benefit from the illicit trade. Both the U-S and Colombian governments have said repeatedly there will be no U-S military intervention in the conflict. Policy enacted under the Clinton Administration limited the number of military trainers in Colombia to 400. As of early 2002 there were 250 American troops in Colombia, 50 Defense Department civilians and 100 contractors, some of whom operated aircraft that spray herbicide on Colombian coca fields.

The United States has tried to establish a clear distinction between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency in the country for multiple reasons one of them is simply that current legislation inhibits it from becoming involved in counter-insurgency efforts on a global level. The shift from drug trafficking organizations to terrorist organizations in terms of their representation of the FARC could essentially lead to a more direct counter-insurgent effort.

Comments by a top US official suggesting the United States might use military force against armed Colombian groups that Washington considers as terrorist organizations met with a swift, and largely negative, reaction in Colombia. The comments came from the State Department's chief of counter-terrorism, Francis Taylor, who was discussing how the Bush administration views the situation in Colombia after the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States.

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, providing support for counternarcotics and other anti-crime efforts around the world is more important than ever, according to James Mack, deputy assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs. Testifying 10 October 2001 before the House Committee on International Relations' subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Mack said that "there often is a nexus between terrorism and organized crime," adding: "Many of the skills and types of equipment needed to attack organized crime are applicable to combating terrorism." He further noted that "the same criminal gangs involved in narcotics smuggling have links to other criminal activities and to terrorist groups."

The FARC broke off negotiations with the government in October 2001, protesting government security measures around the zone and military flights over the territory. On 12 January 2002, President Pastrana gave the FARC 48 hours to come up with a new proposal for talks, or, he said, he would abolish the safe zone he had granted them three years earlier as a condition for talks. Colombian army units took up positions around the zone and many people here feared a major escalation of the war was imminent. That crisis was averted on 14 January 2002, when the FARC agreed to immediate talks, and dropped the complaint about government security measures. The resulting agreement on a timetable for talks represents the most significant advance toward peace in Colombia in nearly four decades of war.

On 20 January 2002 representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, have signed an agreement with the government of President Andres Pastrana that sets a timetable for peace negotiations. Less than four hours before the deadline for an agreement set by President Pastrana was to expire, the rebels and government negotiators announced their timetable and plan for talks. The last-minute accord prevented what many feared would be an escalation of the 38-year civil conflict. The timetable included a number of target dates for completing discussions of such issues as a cease-fire, kidnappings and other action that harm civilians, and the dismantling of anti-rebel para-military groups. The timetable set 07 April 2002 as the deadline for reaching an accord on these issues.

In February 2002 the Bush Administration's 25-billion-dollar foreign affairs budget proposal for FY2002 included $98 million to help Colombia protect the strategic Cano-Limon-Covenas pipeline. The 700-kilometer long pipeline connects an oilfield in northeastern Colombia operated by the US-based Occidental Petroleum Corporation to a tanker port on the Caribbean coast. Guerrilla attacks had shut down the pipeline for 240 days during 2001, costing Colombia considerable revenue, causing serious environmental damage, and depriving the United States of an energy source. The pipeline-defense plan drew criticism from Senate Democrat Patrick Leahy, who said the proposal drew the United States further into what he termed a "military quagmire" in Colombia, and said Congress should be very reluctant to lend support. The US money would go to train two brigades of Colombian troops to protect the pipeline and eventually other parts of the country's infrastructure including power lines frequently targeted by guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC.

On 20 February 2002 Colombian President Andres Pastrana decided to end his longstanding efforts to conduct peace negotiations with the FARC. Pastrana's decision put a new focus on counter-terrorism in Colombia. the peace process came to an abrupt end after three years during which the government struggled to make progress toward peace with the country's largest leftist rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. President Andres Pastrana ended the peace process following a hijacking and kidnapping by suspected rebels. Pastrana ordered the army to march back into the demilitarized zone. Shortly after the announcement, the rebels began abandoning towns in the zone.

On 06 March 2002 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution in support of Colombia and that country's efforts to "counter threats from U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations." The resolution called on President Bush to send legislation to Congress that would help Colombia protect itself from U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations and "the scourge of illicit narcotics."

On 18 March 2002 the United States indicted members of a Colombian guerrilla group for conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States, and for manufacturing and distributing cocaine in Colombia with the intent of exporting it to the United States, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft announced. Ashcroft said the indictment charges three members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for drug trafficking, along with four other men, including three Brazilian nationals. Ashcroft said the indictment marks the convergence of two of the top priorities of his agency: "the prevention of terrorism and the reduction of illegal drug use."

In March 2002 The Bush administration drafted a plan to expand the US military role in Colombia from counterdrug training to anti-terrorism. The policy shift could require as many as 100 additional American troops to be sent to Colombia.

Most Colombians back President Uribe's get-tough approach to the civil conflict. That is why they voted him into office in May 2002. After winning the presidency, Mr. Uribe said he would be willing to negotiate with all armed groups in Colombia that agree to a ceasefire and refrain from acts of terrorism. Mr. Uribe made clear that the paramilitary groups were included in this. Alavro Uribe was critical of the Pastrana peace initiative from the beginning and called for a tougher approach with the guerrillas. He has proposed a large increase in military spending and an expansion of police forces nationwide. Mr. Uribe would also establish a citizens' network throughout the country to support the military by providing information about armed insurgent groups.

Even wealthy and middle-class citizens are voicing support for a special war tax that they are starting to pay in September 2002. The tax amounts to about one-point-two percent of liquid assets and is expected to raise more than 800 thousand dollars in additional revenue for the armed forces. But human rights activists are expressing concern that increased military action will adversely affect civilians living in zones of conflict. They are especially concerned about limits on civil liberties in two zones created under the state of emergency President Uribe declared last month and fully authorized in September 2002. In the two zones military commanders have authority over all law enforcement personnel and may limit citizen movements. Foreigners need special permission to even enter the zones.

In October 2002, eighteen months after an American missionary plane was mistakenly shot down, the United States resumed a campaign to help Colombia track and force down drug flights. The program was suspended in April 2001 in Colombia and Peru after a Peruvian warplane shot down the missionary flight over the Amazon, killing an American and her infant daughter. Colombian warplanes will intercept drug flights based on intelligence from the United States.