Lessons Learned from a Military Leadership Failure

[thedrifter]

07-11-2003

Lessons Learned from a Military Leadership Failure

By Matthew Dodd



Two weeks ago, I provided a detailed summary of the Navy Inspector General?s investigation report that ultimately led to the resignation of Vice Adm. Richard J. Naughton as the U.S. Naval Academy?s superintendent on June 3, and his subsequent Chief-of-Naval Operations-approved request to retire from active duty (?Leadership Failure at Naval Academy,? DefenseWatch, June 28, 2003).



I am sure some senior military purists would say that my article went too far in ?airing the dirty laundry? of a senior military officer who has suffered enough public and private anguish over his difficult circumstances. I would argue that my first article, like all the public media?s coverage of this event, did not go nearly far enough.



It is not very often that the public gets a glimpse inside military leadership failures. The U.S. military establishment is very much like any private or governmental institution when it comes to its reputation and public perceptions management ? they all want to project their maximum positive images and minimize their most negative exposures. While this management philosophy works well from a short-term public relations perspective, it robs the very institution it is trying to protect of a great opportunity for introspection that can lead to long-term development of a professional leadership-refinement culture.



James M. Strock, author of Reagan on Leadership: Executive Lessons from the Great Communicator, wrote, ?While no one can get inside someone else?s mind, one can observe patterns of behavior that reflect habits of thought.? Let me share with you my own patterns of behavior analysis of the Navy Inspector General report?s content and its conclusions, and the additional information that has been provided by the public media from a leadership lessons learned perspective.



The beginning of the end for Naughton was his assault on his own sentry. A sentry is an official and symbolic representative of the commander. In his duty status, the sentry carries the full authority of the commander to maintain order and discipline at his assigned post. In every unit in which I have served as a career military officer, an assault on a sentry was handled as an assault on the commander. These basic beliefs were instilled in me during my earliest moments in uniform, and were always understood and unquestionably accepted and expected by all ranks.



From that perspective, I just cannot believe that any commander would testify as Naughton did, according to the report:



?When asked if it would have been proper to grab the Sentry?s hand, after the Sentry grabbed his ID card out of his hand, the Admiral responded, ?That?s hard to say? ? When asked, hypothetically, if there was any condition in which a Sentry should be touched in that way, the Superintendent said, ?That?s hard to say. That?s hard to say. That?s very hard to say.? ?



Based on the evidence, the report unequivocally concluded that Naughton violated Article 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), assault upon a Sentinel or lookout in the execution of duty. One has to wonder why no charges were pressed against Naughton. Perhaps a big part of the answer lies within the process that approved of Naughton?s appointment as superintendent. According to a June 7, 2003 article in The Baltimore Sun:



?Traditionally, the chief of naval operations, the Navy?s top officer, evaluates candidates for superintendent with the Navy secretary, who then makes a recommendation to the president. The Senate votes on the president?s nominee.?



From my experience, the secretary?s recommendation is usually rubber-stamped by both the president and the Senate. The chief of naval operations is likely the only one in this process who has had prior personal and professional contact with the candidates. Therefore, his evaluations and recommendation must be very influential in the ultimate appointment of the superintendent.



Admiral Vern Clark, the current chief of naval operations, accepted Naughton?s resignation, and approved his request to retire. According to a June 16 Navy Times article, Clark?s vice chief, Adm. William J. Fallon, ?did not agree with the report?s conclusion that Naughton failed to adequately promote good morale among faculty and staff .? ? Whether or not Clark agreed with Fallon, he still had to consider the solid UCMJ violation. I seriously doubt that the Navy would be as lenient with a junior officer or senior enlisted sailor who committed the same offense. I suspect those less-experienced sailors would face a court-martial for assaulting a sentry.



Clark has remained extremely low-key with regards to this obviously personal, professional, and institutional embarrassment. I sense that Clark would like nothing more than for this case to go away quickly, with as few questions as possible. If Clark was largely responsible for Naughton?s appointment, then Clark?s judgment and criteria for evaluation must be called into question when Naughton?s performance fell short of the expected standards. I would like to hear Clark?s rationale for allowing Naughton to escape any punitive action, except for what Naughton himself requested, and for allowing Naughton to retain his pension and benefits.



I find it extremely hard to believe that Clark was unaware of Naughton?s reputation as described in these recent news media excerpts:



?[O]ne of the Navy?s most feared three-star admirals ? well-known throughout the Navy for a nasty disposition and a ?confrontational and demeaning? manner ?. But at least as far back ? as a decade ago, his temper and domineering style often left subordinates emotionally bruised and demoralized .? ?Some people think you can manage by intimidation .? At some point it doesn?t work anymore.? ? ?He is a man who delights in abusing anyone under him, bullying and intimidating, when tact and courtesy could accomplish the same mission with a minimum of fuss? ? ?The Navy?s selection of Naughton as superintendent of the academy a year ago surprised longtime academy observers and people who worked with him.? ?



According to one publication, a Navy captain at the Pentagon shares my belief about Clark?s judgment:



?It was no secret the CNO knew what Naughton was and how he abused his subordinates, yet he looked the other way. Clark was willing to indulge Naughton?s boorish behavior and temper tantrums, but it blew up in his face. Deservedly so.?



It is blatantly obvious to me that Clark set Naughton up for failure by appointing him superintendent at the academy, where, according to the June 6 article in The Baltimore Sun:



?[S]uperintendents are expected to be walking examples of the school?s high ideals. At the same time, they need a politician?s knack for gracefully juggling the interests of students, faculty, the public, the Pentagon and Congress, not to mention alumni. Never before had Naughton taken an assignment that so placed him in the public spotlight.?



Leaders accept responsibility for their actions. From the report and public media accounts, Naughton was repeatedly in denial of any responsibility for his circumstances and his actions:



* ?It wasn?t necessarily me accepting [the job] so much as them choosing me,? he said.



* Despite multiple witnesses testifying that he grabbed the sentry?s hand, including his long-time friends, Naughton repeatedly said, ?I just don?t remember that. I do not remember that ?. I may have touched his hand, but I didn?t grab his hand. To my knowledge, I don?t remember grabbing his hand. No.?



* ?Over the past few months, too much attention has been focused by media and others on the superintendent. Because of this attention, I have asked the chief of naval operations to reassign me elsewhere and to bring in new leadership ?.?



My comment: I am particularly disturbed that he did not admit that it was his own actions that brought on the attention, and instead blamed the news media and others for creating the conditions that he felt were intolerable.

Lastly, I am troubled by the statement released by academy spokesman Cmdr. Rod Gibbons in response to Naughton?s resignation. ?Today?s announcement came as a surprise. Vice Adm. Naughton is well respected, and we will be sad to see him leave.? Compare those comments to the following news media excerpts:



?Across the campus on the banks of the Severn ? employees expressed few regrets about Naughton?s departure ?. Whether or not they agreed with his goals, many subordinates chafed at his manner ? midshipmen said in interviews that they never warmed to Naughton, who struck them as a bully and a scold ?. ?Short answer ? don?t like him,? said a midshipman .? ?We have this idea of him up in a throne in the administration building viewing his subjects? ? [a Navy captain at the academy said] ?I don?t ever want to go back near that guy again .? ? But Naughton?s short fuse was widely known among the 4,000-strong midshipmen and in the close-knit community of teachers, staff members and parents who support them on their way to becoming Navy and Marine Corps officers.?



I am curious as to what Gibbons meant by ?well respected,? and exactly who the ?we? is who will be sad to see Naughton leave, since it appears that most in and around the Academy did not respect the man nor leader, and that few will miss Naughton?s presence.

Obviously, Naughton did not suddenly become a tyrannical leader when he took over the academy. His leadership style was honed, nurtured, and rewarded all throughout his 35-year career. That fact alone leads to many simple questions with uneasy answers:



* Why was his behavior and leadership style tolerated for so long by so many seniors?



* What happened to accomplishing the mission and taking care of the troops ? the ?twin pillars? of traditional military leadership?



* How much damage has Naughton, and his enabling senior officers, done throughout his career to individuals (destroyed morale, voluntarily and involuntarily shortened careers) and the institution he served (missed opportunities, stifled subordinate initiative)?



* Is Naughton the ?poster boy? for performance evaluation and personnel assignment management systems reform? Should the military go to a ?360-degree? performance review system that includes performance assessment inputs from seniors, peers, and subordinates?



Despite all the negativity inherent in my analysis of the Naughton case, I am optimistic that the Navy is taking positive steps to turn things around at the academy, beginning with the presidential nomination of Rear Adm. Rodney P. Rempt to succeed Naughton as superintendent.



According to the July 8 article in The Washington Post, Rempt, the head of the Naval War College, is described in sharp contrast to Naughton as:



?[A] level-headed intellectual who treated subordinates well ? qualities that made him the Navy's first choice to take over the academy ... [cited for his] ?strong leadership and forward thinking? ? ?He was a terrific leader of the War College, and I think he will be a terrific leader at Annapolis,? said Alberto R. Coll, the dean of the college?s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. ?He's a great team builder ?. He does that by setting the example himself? ? Former subordinates at the War College said Rempt exercised a more friendly kind of leadership without simply aiming to be popular. ?He is not a screamer; he is a very courteous, gentlemanly officer with a strong personality .? He's not interested in making enemies. There are some naval officers who look forward to it, even enjoy it, but he's just the opposite.?



Do not let Navy senior leadership silence about the Naughton case deceive you into downplaying the seriousness of senior military leadership failures. Do not think that Naughton is alone as a perverse distortion of effective military leadership, but also do not be misled into thinking that there is a significant percentage of Naughtonesque leaders infecting our military.



My perspective is that even one Naughton in the military is too many because of the potential lives at stake.





Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd USMC is a Senior Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.


Leadership Failure Article....
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Sempers,

Roger