President Father Bush Speaks: Past Conclusions Pertinent Today

Hello Everyone:

Whether you are for or against the war in Iraq, it is always best to
review, evaluate, and analyze the outcome of actions presented in the
name of military victory. America has the muscle and the
technological might to suceed in the normal battlefield front, but
what we lack is the ability to confront the urban malaise that we are
currently faced with. The more the we try to win the hearts and with
the American cultural context in the Muslim world, the more we find
that Iraqis would just as soon as see us leave.

The fact is that we are in too deep to be able to step out of the muck
that has seen us lose American treasure, and our most precious
resource, the men and women of our armed services. America must get
the Iraq situation correct, or be look down upon by the rest of the
world for years to come.

President Bush's father wrote a piece about why he chose to cut off
the Gulf war early in the 1990s, and it is haunting to how it rings
true today. Please take time to read his piece which I have attached
below, and offer comments for debate.

Peace is better than war,

Famous


__________________________________________________ ______________________________


"Why We Didn't Remove Saddam" George Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft
Time (2 March 1998)

The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which
surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for
the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the
guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic
objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's
threat to the region) we stopped the fighting.

But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of
war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately
left unresolved problems, and new ones arose. We were disappointed
that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our
Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush
repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the
Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would
be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise
to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would
topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished
to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the
long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf.

Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an
occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not
changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and
would have incurred incalculable human and political costs.
Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find
Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced
to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would
instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other
allies pulling out as well.

Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously
trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war
world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the
U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international
response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion
route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a
bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically
different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of
Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus
the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of
such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we
would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two
options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from
our demands. The latter would have sent a disastrous signal. The
former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de
facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable
choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted
him to send one of his generals.

Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as
air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a
viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission;
Safwan was waiting. As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of
urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and
return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an
absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks
that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be
there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine fanned these worries.

Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies,
who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their
assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and
left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our
conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified.
We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle
East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also
crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies
in the region.

Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his
image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and
substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in
Madrid. The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging
post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and
restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the
outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of
precedent we should lay down for the future.

From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to
respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which
could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms,
we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost
was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly
with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be
aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it alone,
that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a
practical matter.

Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the
backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

President Bush's father was correct that a war in Iraq would be more
negative than positive.

Peace is better than war,

Famous


famous21@msn.com (Famous21) wrote in message news:<4992d255.0310282224.3746e698@posting.google.com>...
> Hello Everyone:
>
> Whether you are for or against the war in Iraq, it is always best to
> review, evaluate, and analyze the outcome of actions presented in the
> name of military victory. America has the muscle and the
> technological might to suceed in the normal battlefield front, but
> what we lack is the ability to confront the urban malaise that we are
> currently faced with. The more the we try to win the hearts and with
> the American cultural context in the Muslim world, the more we find
> that Iraqis would just as soon as see us leave.
>
> The fact is that we are in too deep to be able to step out of the muck
> that has seen us lose American treasure, and our most precious
> resource, the men and women of our armed services. America must get
> the Iraq situation correct, or be look down upon by the rest of the
> world for years to come.
>
> President Bush's father wrote a piece about why he chose to cut off
> the Gulf war early in the 1990s, and it is haunting to how it rings
> true today. Please take time to read his piece which I have attached
> below, and offer comments for debate.
>
> Peace is better than war,
>
> Famous
>
>
> __________________________________________________ ______________________________
>
>
> "Why We Didn't Remove Saddam" George Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft
> Time (2 March 1998)
>
> The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which
> surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for
> the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the
> guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic
> objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's
> threat to the region) we stopped the fighting.
>
> But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of
> war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately
> left unresolved problems, and new ones arose. We were disappointed
> that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our
> Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush
> repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the
> Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would
> be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise
> to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would
> topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished
> to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the
> long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf.
>
> Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an
> occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not
> changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and
> would have incurred incalculable human and political costs.
> Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find
> Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced
> to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would
> instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other
> allies pulling out as well.
>
> Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously
> trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war
> world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the
> U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international
> response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion
> route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a
> bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically
> different--and perhaps barren--outcome.
>
> We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of
> Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus
> the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of
> such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we
> would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two
> options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from
> our demands. The latter would have sent a disastrous signal. The
> former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de
> facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable
> choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted
> him to send one of his generals.
>
> Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as
> air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a
> viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission;
> Safwan was waiting. As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of
> urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and
> return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an
> absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks
> that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be
> there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine fanned these worries.
>
> Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies,
> who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their
> assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and
> left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our
> conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified.
> We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle
> East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also
> crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies
> in the region.
>
> Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his
> image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and
> substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in
> Madrid. The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging
> post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and
> restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the
> outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of
> precedent we should lay down for the future.
>
> From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to
> respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which
> could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms,
> we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost
> was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly
> with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be
> aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it alone,
> that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a
> practical matter.
>
> Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the
> backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

To bad he didn't edit it down to a hundred words and take out all the
big ones. Then maybe his son would have read it.

Famous21 wrote:
>
> Hello Everyone:
>
> Whether you are for or against the war in Iraq, it is always best to
> review, evaluate, and analyze the outcome of actions presented in the
> name of military victory. America has the muscle and the
> technological might to suceed in the normal battlefield front, but
> what we lack is the ability to confront the urban malaise that we are
> currently faced with. The more the we try to win the hearts and with
> the American cultural context in the Muslim world, the more we find
> that Iraqis would just as soon as see us leave.
>
> The fact is that we are in too deep to be able to step out of the muck
> that has seen us lose American treasure, and our most precious
> resource, the men and women of our armed services. America must get
> the Iraq situation correct, or be look down upon by the rest of the
> world for years to come.
>
> President Bush's father wrote a piece about why he chose to cut off
> the Gulf war early in the 1990s, and it is haunting to how it rings
> true today. Please take time to read his piece which I have attached
> below, and offer comments for debate.
>
> Peace is better than war,
>
> Famous
>
> __________________________________________________ ______________________________
>
> "Why We Didn't Remove Saddam" George Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft
> Time (2 March 1998)
>
> The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which
> surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for
> the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the
> guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic
> objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's
> threat to the region) we stopped the fighting.
>
> But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of
> war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately
> left unresolved problems, and new ones arose. We were disappointed
> that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our
> Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush
> repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the
> Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would
> be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise
> to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would
> topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished
> to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the
> long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf.
>
> Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an
> occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not
> changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and
> would have incurred incalculable human and political costs.
> Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find
> Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced
> to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would
> instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other
> allies pulling out as well.
>
> Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously
> trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war
> world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the
> U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international
> response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion
> route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a
> bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically
> different--and perhaps barren--outcome.
>
> We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of
> Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus
> the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of
> such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we
> would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two
> options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from
> our demands. The latter would have sent a disastrous signal. The
> former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de
> facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable
> choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted
> him to send one of his generals.
>
> Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as
> air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a
> viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission;
> Safwan was waiting. As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of
> urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and
> return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an
> absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks
> that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be
> there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine fanned these worries.
>
> Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies,
> who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their
> assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and
> left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our
> conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified.
> We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle
> East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also
> crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies
> in the region.
>
> Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his
> image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and
> substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in
> Madrid. The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging
> post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and
> restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the
> outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of
> precedent we should lay down for the future.
>
> From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to
> respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which
> could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms,
> we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost
> was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly
> with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be
> aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it alone,
> that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a
> practical matter.
>
> Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the
> backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.