SFTT ( Hackworth ) Two Year Summary of Achievements

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http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/c....1319328179919

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Achievements:



SFTT Two Year Summary



In its first two years of operation -- apart from higher-profile hits like David Hackworth?s 60 Minutes piece -- the Soldiers for the Truth Foundation has pursued seven general mission objectives for investigation and analysis at its website at SFTT.org and DefenseWatch magazine: (1) Leadership flaws in the DoD and military services; (2) Adequacy and efficacy of combat training; (3) Reliability of logistic support to the troops; (4) Adequacy and reliability of military weapons and equipment; (5) Waste and abuse in defense spending; (6) Abuses of soldiers by the military system, and (7) Veterans? Benefits under siege.



In all of these areas, our group of volunteer editors has consistently broken new ground in identifying trends and issues that the mainstream news media either failed to recognize or chose to ignore. DefenseWatch at SFTT.org has become a major player in the national dialogue on the military, with its articles regularly picked up or cited by national media organizations and its content circulated to an international audience through its own website as well as a content partnership agreement with Military.com.



Here are some samples of our achievements since the launch of DefenseWatch magazine the week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks plunged the nation and its military into the new wars of the 21st century.



1. Scrutinizing Leadership Flaws in the Dept. of Defense and Military Services



A. Conduct of the War in Afghanistan:



After the generals declared victory in the first major ground battle in Afghanistan in March 2002, Col. Hackworth dissected the operation and revealed the truth: there was no victory.



?Will They Ever Get It Right?? DefenseWatch, March 20, 2002



Now we've just finished the first big U.S. conventional fight of the Afghanistan War. Sadly, our fine troops trained in the flatlands of New York and Kentucky weren't conditioned for mountain warfare at elevations of 9,000 feet, where their cruel and crafty enemy knew every fold in the ground. Our Joes were sent into battle loaded down like pack mules, insufficiently prepared for the freezing conditions and far from physically up for the game. The guerrillas also outranged our grunts both with a superior .30-caliber rifle, as opposed to our little popgun 5.56 M-16, and by the use of reverse slope mortars. The crying shame is that our soldiers - bunched up like beetles at a bugfest - weren't ready to face some of the toughest fighters in the world employing the same timeworn tactics they used to defeat the Soviets and the Brits. And when our brave Apache gunship pilots came to the rescue, they lost all their ships to enemy fire. The guerrillas cleverly recycled the same techniques with which they destroyed fleets of Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan and again in Somalia during Black Hawk Down.



The generals, from jovial Tommy Franks down to the two-star on the ground, didn't get much right until they shrewdly declared victory and hauled butt away from the bomb craters and their plan that went awry. The generals had envisioned sealing the enemy inside a noose and then pounding him with bombs, a tactic that seldom worked in Vietnam and didn't work in Afghanistan this time around. Firepower's never the answer unless battle-ready soldiers deployed smartly back it up. It didn't help that our intelligence was bad regarding the size of the enemy force and its willingness to fight. Or that we forgot the lesson learned in Vietnam - never to allow the success of an operation to be dependent on a non-U.S. unit - and trusted our so-called Afghan allies, who left us in the lurch.



After a deadly friendly-fire incident involving an F-16 and Canadian troops in Afghanistan, DefenseWatch was the first media organization to posit that the mishap may have had its roots in the Air National Guard unit?s leadership record.



?Friendly Fire, And a Broken National Guard,? J. David Galland, DefenseWatch, May 1, 2002



[The F-16] pilot saw muzzle flashes on the ground from the Canadian small-arms exercise and mistakenly believed he was under attack. Ignoring the controller, the pilot still fired in what he apparently believed was self-defense. Seconds later, four young Canadian soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, were killed and eight were seriously wounded when a 500-pound laser-guided bomb from the F-16 fell on their position.



At this juncture, it is unknown what path the official investigations into the accident are taking - whether the focus will remain on the one F-16 pilot and his particular conduct that night, or whether the inquest will expand into a broader probe of how the Central Command is managing its ongoing air operations in Afghanistan. From my corner of the foxhole, the Pentagon should widen the probe even farther to investigate the background of the Illinois Air National Guard whose unit, aircraft and pilot are at the center of the tragedy. As examined in depth by DefenseWatch and other news media organizations this spring, it is very clear by now that many National Guard units are dysfunctional, outdated, under-trained, and under-qualified to carry out their peacetime and wartime missions.





B. Conduct of the War in Iraq


Ten months before Operation Iraqi Freedom began, one DefenseWatch editor presciently forecast the postwar dilemma that the United States is struggling with today.



?Victory Is Possible - But Then What?? Patrick Hayes, DefenseWatch, May 15, 2002



What would happen next inside Iraq itself [after the combat victory]? That is the question that no one has yet raised, or answered. What the policymakers in Washington seem to ignore in all U.S. endeavors in the Middle East is that the locals see the United States, or any Western power, as interlopers, infidels and outsiders. As such, U.S. troops would be unable to remain in Iraq as an occupying force for long without further inflaming the Muslim world - even if we had the capability of staying. In any event, the United States just does not have the staying power it had following World War II to maintain a large and effective occupying force in Iraq while that country tries to pull itself together after more than 33 years under Saddam Hussein's psychotic rule (and a tangled history of despots before him). Fighting a multi-faceted war against Islamic terror worldwide, the United States does not have the resources (read manpower and logistics) to "occupy" Iraq until it has the capacity to elect a parliament and move towards a stable economy and democratic system of government. We can't even maintain a viable combat force in Afghanistan! ? The ugly truth is that for all of the quantitative superiority of the U.S. military on paper, we do not today have a sufficient force to carry out the long-term requirements that our political leaders have identified.



Equally prescient was a DefenseWatch article in the spring of 2002 that flatly concluded that the U.S. military must be enlarged if it is to succeed in the multi-front war on terrorism. It would be another year before the mainstream news media pounced on this vital issue.



?We Really Do Need A Larger Military, Mr. Rumsfeld,? Paul Connors, DefenseWatch, May 22, 2002



When several four-star officers finally offered up the truth to Congress and revealed the true state of their forces in March, they received a rebuke from Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld that displayed the arrogance and lack of knowledge that we had come to expect from the three twits who had preceded him under Clinton, the most disgraceful Commander-in-Chief this country has ever seen.



Rumsfeld's reaction was especially disheartening since it came from a man representing an administration that has vowed to restore and transform the military after years of neglect. ... There would seem to be one of two directions to choose: Either we can cut back on commitments, or add people to the force so that the military can keep those same commitments. But it's not just about personnel. We still need massive infusions of money to replace worn-out and obsolete systems still in current use. If we're going to challenge all the bad guys who threaten our way of life, then it stands to reason that sooner or later, those efforts will require the presence of American fighting forces on the ground and preferably, in the other guy's country so that ours doesn't get destroyed.



Col. Hackworth was among the very first military analysts to recognize that a guerrilla war was emerging in post-combat Iraq.



(?Trained to Die,? DefenseWatch, July 8, 2003)



Whatever Rummy wants to call it, we?re still stuck in a classic Phase I Guerrilla War (G-War). And every day, Iraq becomes a more dangerous place, with the potential of becoming even worse if our brass don?t start understanding the enemy and the nature of the same sort of G-type ops that crippled Napoleon in Spain, bloodied the Brits in Northern Ireland and postponed the peace process in Israel. This won?t be the first time I?ve crossed swords with Rumsfeld over his assessment of ground operations in Iraq ? which I?ve come to believe he and his principal Pentagon advisers know frighteningly little about. During the invasion, I took a lot of heat over my evaluation that we were going into Iraq too light and with the wrong mix of troops. It was clear to me that we needed more line doggies, combat MPs to restore order and engineers, civil-affairs and psychological-warfare people to get the country up and running soonest to start winning the hearts and minds of the millions of Iraqis who wanted the coalition to rebuild Iraq and then go home, thank you very much.



He was also the first to recognize that the current Centcom strategy for handling the guerrillas needed to be changed.



(?Bring Back ?The Gunfighter?,? DefenseWatch, July 29, 2003)



Once again, the U.S. military is ignoring the past and repeating yesterday?s battlefield mistakes. Mistakes that could be cured with some creative, out-of-the-box intervention, such as pulling a few proven guerrilla fighters out of retirement to advise the conventional generals on the Art of Unconventional Warfare. Not only could these experts consult on what?s going down with the troops, they'd be on the ground to help commanders figure out how to capture fiends like the terror twins instead of being so fast on the trigger.



Military successes deserve scrutiny as well as failures. The rescue of Iraqi POW Pfc. Jessica Lynch confirmed the increasing reliance on special operations forces and the strides they have made in the past 20 years.



?Spectacular Rescue Mission Had Deep Roots,? By R.J. Thomas, DefenseWatch, Apr. 9, 2003



There have been largely unpublicized successes enjoyed by combined SOF units in Afghanistan against the Taliban, and in the pre-attack and early of the war in Iraq that will probably not be fully revealed for years ? largely to protect ?sources and methods? of unconventional warfighting. Sketchy outlines of these missions have emerged in news reporting, including the quick takedown of the Iraqi oil fields, the isolation of Iraqi military bases in western Iraq, the unconventional war being fought with the Kurds and 173 Airborne Brigade in northern Iraq, and unconfirmed accounts of SOF reconnaissance teams in Baghdad itself long before conventional units arrived. These are all indicators that USSOCOM and its joint special operations command planners have achieved a true synergy based on effective inter-service cooperation and training.





C. Mismanaged National Guard/Reserve mobilization:



DefenseWatch was one of the very first news organizations to identify and spell out the implications to morale and retention of the Pentagon?s botched mobilization. Our sustained coverage has prompted an outpouring of responses from activated reservists.



?Poor Planning, Leadership Are Hurting the Reserve Component,? Paul Connors, DefenseWatch, Feb. 20, 2002



Air Guard and Air Force Reserve rescue wings have received orders to cover various AEF or Enduring Freedom/Noble Eagle missions, many of them overseas. In one ANG wing, members were offered the choice of volunteering for as little as 45 days overseas with 60-90 days at home station, or face mobilization for a full year. Those members who could not volunteer because of civilian job or family requirements are now faced with what appears to be retaliatory action by their own units. In essence, they are being pressured into volunteering for a shorter tour or face the prospects of a year away from home, family and jobs. ... Given the fluid and dynamic nature of the mobilization process and this new type of war, reserve component personnel have a right to expect honesty and candor from their local unit commanders and staffs. Advance notification of what career fields are required, how many of each are needed and the length of deployment are just a few pieces of information the average reserve component soldier or airman has a right to expect from his or her local chain of command.



?Pentagon Cooking the Books on Reserve/Guard Callups,? Paul Connors, DefenseWatch, March 6, 2002



What the news media conveniently omit and what the general public either chooses to ignore or is completely unaware of, are the hardships endured by reserve component troops, their families and - last but not forgotten - their employers. Civilian employers, whether in the private sector or in local, state or federal government agencies, have had to get used to losing their employees for various missions since Operation Desert Storm. It is probably safe to say that most didn't like it. This new war continues to be a drain on our military resources and because the active component was almost neutered by the criminally negligent force cuts imposed on the military by the Clinton administration, the nation has been forced to place an ever-increasing emphasis on the use of the reserve component.



As this war continues for an indeterminate period, rest assured that more and more reserve units and individuals will be activated to support the increase in military operations. As the mobilizations continue, more families will suffer financial setbacks, more employers will have to replace missing workers and more mothers and fathers will leave their children in the care of others. And sadly, only those directly affected by the mobilizations will know the true cost of the use of the reserves and Guard.



(?Respect our Reserve Heroes, Too,? Hackworth, DefenseWatch, Sept. 2, 2003)



Since 9/11, tens of thousands of Reserve and Guard soldiers have reported to the colors, responding to the cry, ?Call up the reserves!? More than 200,000 of these mislabeled ?part-time warriors? have been activated and are serving in the bloody trenches of Iraq and Afghanistan, providing the security, logistical muscle and brains to support our legions around this war-weary globe. And, of course, they?re part of the team securing the USA as well. ... More than one-third of the 200,000 reservists already called to active duty are missing civilian promotions and losing money by serving. Many say the military medical plan that's supposed to replace their civilian plans sucks; thousands of our activated reservists choose their civilian medical plans over the military?s and pay for same out of their own pockets. ... Too many of the recalled reservists have been finding out that the old axiom ?hurry up and wait? is alive and well in today?s force. After dropping everything when Uncle Sam says, ?Get here quick smart,? they kiss the spouse and kids goodbye only to find themselves sitting on their duffel bags at Base X or Y, doing demeaning, keep-?em-busy stuff.



(?Another Threat to Reservists: Unemployment,? Ed Offley, DefenseWatch, Sept. 19, 2003)



Hundreds of thousands of reservists and National Guardsmen have been hit by a triple whammy since 9/11. This is a warning for all of you out there that a fourth blow could be on the way. ... Having been jerked around willy-nilly by the Pentagon and their own service branches for the past two years, many reservists and Guardsmen may be about to take it on the chin from a different source ? their civilian employers. ... [The U.S. Labor] Department is currently investigating 1,300 cases where reservists or Guardsmen have left active duty only to find themselves out of a job ? something that USERRA explicitly prohibits.



The response from the troops on just one column was overwhelming.



(?Reservists Respond En Masse to Hackworth Column,? Feedback, Sept. 8, 2003)



Thanks to Col. David Hackworth for his column on the reserves (?Respect Our Reserve Heroes, Too,? DefenseWatch, Sept. 2, 2003). As a reservist twice mobilized and probably staring at a third, I appreciate someone speaking out about the institutional bigotry of the active component. My MPs are better than AC MPs - not because they are better soldiers or persons, but they bring a lot more experience, skill and knowledge to the table than the average 18-to-19-year-old straight out of boot camp.



--Izzy Rommes



While in Kyrgyzstan, we were told that we would be leaving in three months, then six months, then 12 months, then it was an open-ended assignment. Finally, we got a date to come home. Just four months after returning home last November, we were recalled to home base to prepare to deploy once again. I made all of the necessary arrangements with my family and my job so that I could deploy again, only to be told two weeks later that it was all canceled. ...



--Marcus Riggins, Tech. Sgt. SCANG



From what I read, the so-called ?Total Force? approach was developed in the early 1970s as a reaction to the fact that the reserves were mostly not activated during the Vietnam conflict, while young inexperienced draftees made up most of the force going into the war. However, it seems that many on the active duty side of the equation look at us reservists as cheap manpower that can be moved around without consideration to our skills and experience. Too often, we?re treated as second-class citizens.



--John Dittmer, Lt. Cmdr. USNR



I am a surgeon in private practice and have served in the Army Reserve for almost ten years. I was called to active duty in support of Operation Noble Eagle and assigned to a base in the CONUS. Much to my surprise and dismay, upon reporting for duty I discovered that I was not expected nor needed. My superior officers had no idea why I was activated and had little use for me.



--Underemployed Soldier



During one of my visits to Fort Stewart, I saw the double standard firsthand, both from non-coms and officers in the regular Army. For the most part, it was mostly how we were ?no-gos,? not ready for anything more than being in parades, that we were a bunch of rednecks and needed to be baby-sat constantly. One of our guys (an E-6) had to go to the hospital on base for something for a couple of days. Says he was treated well until it was noted he was in the Guard. He was given his papers and thrown in a Hummer within the hour of that being found out.



--Tyson Boheler



Some of those soldiers were off orders for four days before they were activated again in 2003. A general officer at the RSC signed a memorandum of waiver of Army Policy because ?the critical shortages of your military occupational specialty (MOS) and the operational needs of the Army ... is necessary, especially for low-intensity/high-demand skills such as yours.? When those previously activated soldiers and the majority of the rest of the soldiers in that battalion arrived in Kuwait, they were instructed to devise a ?long term training plan.? There was nothing for them to do!



--Peter Lysenko





I am a staff sergeant with a master?s degree, and significant leadership experience. I have combat experience. Not only do I feel I have earned the respect of my brothers and sisters in uniform, I feel my division has done the same. I don?t ask for anything that hasn't been earned. Yet, I cannot get it. ... We in the National Guard are certainly second-class citizens.



--Jimmy Lewis, Staff Sgt. ARNG



C. Corruption in the National Guard



SFTT and DefenseWatch were in the lead when widespread problems in the National Guard emerged nationwide in 2002.



? ?Ghost Soldiers' and Lies Equals Bodybags,? Hackworth, DefenseWatch, Feb. 27, 2002



Many outfits recently called to active duty - for example, units from the 40th NG Division which I served with in combat and in peacetime and where I have many deep throat sources - are in sorry shape. "The level of readiness across the board is poor," says a senior sergeant in the recently activated 1/185th Mechanized Battalion, a Northern California Bradley outfit. "The CO is trying to pencil-whip this unit into combat and if we go, there won't be enough bodybags."



Another sergeant from the same outfit, when asked if his unit was fit to fight, said, "Let's start with basic physical fitness. Our entire battalion's PT (Physical Fitness Test) scores were forged to get us activated. Not one soldier took the test. They were all faked by the folks in the head shed."



"Our equipment and weapons are old and in most cases in worse shape than our soldiers," another sergeant said. "We have some outstanding warriors here. Many have seen combat in Panama, Desert Storm and Somalia, but morale sucks. Important things like the right training and issue of the right gear ain't happening. We're short everything and our Brads are worn out and run like broken cement mixers."



Another 1/185th leader said, "This unit needs to have its top leadership removed, competent leaders installed and go through six to eight months of drilling to get even the basics down. We're dead men walking."



Ongoing Coverage of the National Guard examined the impact of poor leadership on domestic homeland security efforts.



?Leadership Failures Hamper the War Against Terrorism,? John Szelog, DefenseWatch, Apr. 24, 2002



A San Francisco area newspaper reported on April 19 that four Army National Guard members assigned to bridge security details had admitted that they did not have the right weapons or training, and were using substandard equipment. Their complaints ranged from dirty weapons, to outdated bulletproof vests that the Guard had to borrow from the California Highway Patrol, to vehicles that didn't run. The Guardsmen also reported that they were told by their superiors that they were assigned at the bridges "just for show." In response, National Guard and state officials denied that there are any problems, with a Guard spokesman saying that all weapons are serviceable, the protective vests are optional, and the Guard has requested newer vehicles. ? I am forced to conclude that the leadership of the military and our country have developed a severe disconnect with reality. They apparently believe that if they talk about something being done, it will magically happen.



D. The Unfinished Military ?Transformation?


How the U.S. military fights in future wars will depend on an ongoing struggle between Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld and the uniformed services over roles, missions, force structure and money. DefenseWatch has covered this issue extensively.



?After the War Comes the Revolution,? Matthew Dodd, DefenseWatch, Apr. 23, 2003



As the situation in Iraq shifts from combat to stability operations, news media focus is shifting towards the many other defense-related issues that had temporarily faded from public attention. ... For those of you who thought the defense-wide transformation efforts were forgotten when war became a reality in Iraq, think again. In the second week of April, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld served notice to everyone that we have only seen the tip of the transformation iceberg so far

Our victory in Iraq signals the beginning of a true revolution in military affairs here at home. If you listen closely, the sounds you may hear are the status quo being shaken and bureaucratic rice bowls being shattered.



2. Investigating the Adequacy and Efficacy of Combat Training



From the aftermath of 9/11 until the official inquest of the 507th Maintenance Co. ambush in Iraq, SFTT and DefenseWatch have scrutinized the uneven quality and too-common ineffectiveness of U.S. military combat training and have repeatedly exposed serious flaws in the system. Some examples:



?Poor Military Weapons Training a Threat to All,? by John M. Szelog, DefenseWatch, Jan. 16, 2002



Two weeks ago, a California National Guardsman shot himself when he went to withdraw the pistol from his holster at the end of a security watch shift at San Francisco International Airport.



Based on the details in the report, determining the cause of the Dec. 28 incident was simple: He had his finger on the trigger when he was removing the pistol, gave it a good tug along the way, and - bang - he shot himself in the hip, and the bullet exited his buttocks. Now to my prime question: What does this have to do with the U.S. military being a menace to society? ... Many Air Force people will tell you to your face that they didn't join the service to carry a rifle. They'll also tell you that unless the Air Force orders them to carry a rifle, they will refuse to do so. That's not all: Not only do they not want to carry a weapon, but they get very jittery and suspicious when somebody else volunteers to carry a weapon, or even wants to get fully-trained and qualified in case the need ever arises. The logic of this attitude, if you can call it logic, goes like this: If you don't think about situations where you might need a weapon, then those situations won't happen. Likewise, somebody else carrying a weapon is an invitation for a situation where you will need to use a weapon, so don't let anybody else carry a weapon.



?Raise Army Priority for Marksmanship,? William F. Sauerwein, Jan. 16, 2002



These commanders are greatly concerned about the effectiveness of their main gun systems, like the M1A1 Abrams tank and the M3 Bradley IFV. ...

But marksmanship with individual weapons is not given the same emphasis, even in combat infantry units. ... A soldier goes to the zero range where he/she is given nine rounds to zero. Then that soldier is shuttled to the qualification range and given 40 rounds to qualify. ... The marksmanship problem is intensified with combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Many of these soldiers feel that going to the range hinders the performance of their "real job." [Editor?s note: This article appeared more than a year before the deadly 507th Co. ambush where all of the soldiers' weapons jammed.]



?Let?s Lock and Load Now,? Hackworth, Oct. 17, 2001



Today, at virtually every U.S. military installation around the globe -- and now at most of our airports, which are secured by the Army National Guard -- the guys and gals manning the security details at exterior gates and other critical or sensitive areas, including ammo dumps and armories, are as impotent as the Marines were in Lebanon or the sailors in Yemen. They don't have a round in the chamber, and in most cases, they don't even have a magazine in their weapons. Yet America is at war, and we know that thousands of fanatics are out there ready to strike. ... Last week in Germany, where some guards were ordered to tape their rifles' magazine wells for safety, four-star Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs actually charged his colonels with checking on the guards and reporting back to him.



In Afghanistan, one DefenseWatch editor revealed, the Central Command was forced to request the help of British Marines because U.S. soldiers were not physically fit enough to operate in the high altitudes and subfreezing conditions.



?Learning From A Humiliating Lesson in Afghanistan,? Paul Connors, DefenseWatch, Apr. 17, 2002



The most recent and glaring example of this loss of capability was the request by Gen. Tommy Franks that our British allies provide a combat team of Royal Marine Commandos to scour the mountains and valleys in Afghanistan for remaining pockets of Taliban and Al Qaeda combatants when the troops of the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions proved incapable of completing the task. [This was] an admission that we are not as dominant as we thought we were, and that we have confirmed that loss of military capability to a watchful world by having to rely on our staunchest ally, a nation with a military approximately one-fourth the size of ours, to pull our chestnuts out of the fire. What the use of the Royal Marines has proven is that the destructive social engineering policies and gender-based training of the departed Clinton administration have succeeded. ? Those policies have robbed the grunt in the field (especially in the U.S. Army) of the fighting edge and physical capability required to prevail and win when facing a determined, hostile force. Those policies have accomplished what our battlefield enemies have not been able to do: They drove our troops from the battlefield after as little as two weeks in the field ? because of lack of physical ability to carry out the assigned missions.



As the showdown with Iraq neared, Col. Hackworth returned to the issue too many aspects of military training remained insufficient.



?More Sweat in Training, Less Blood in Battle,? David Hackworth, DefenseWatch, Dec. 11, 2002



Today's noncoms have more than a basic load of bitches: too many careerist officers who serve only themselves and don't look after their troops; the prevailing system of risk aversion, which adulterates the needed rigorous training that prepares soldiers to survive and win on the battlefield; and the malignant policy of political correctness, which puts opportunities for minorities and women and consideration-for-others conditioning over the sharp combat edge. But minus the Marine Corps, it's the pathetically slack standards that now hold sway in basic training that take the booby prize. ? The bottom line is that today's basic training simply doesn't instill the required discipline, values and fundamentals of the soldiering trade.



3. Disclosing Poor Logistical Support



As the war with Iraq got underway, we asked why Marines were deploying to the desert without the proper camouflage gear.



?Why Do Marines Wear Green in the Desert?? Roger Moore, DefenseWatch, March 29, 2003



I wonder what all those trees are doing in the Iraqi desert? That was my first impression while watching the live TV broadcasts of U.S. Marines in a firefight outside of Umm Qasr earlier this week. What it was, of course, was the image of Marines wearing desert helmet covers and desert boots ? with woodland camouflage utilities in between. Twelve years after the Gulf War, I found myself wondering why the elite Marines have yet to receive adequate supplies of desert-camouflage uniforms.



Included in a DefenseWatch Special Report on the 507 Maintenance CO. ambush in Iraq, an SFTT contributor revealed a little-known aspect of the tragedy. That logistics troops rarely get adequate preparation for actual combat.



?Guest Column: Army Doctrine Doomed the 507th,? David L. Arnold, DefenseWatch, Aug. 26, 2003



I submit that what happened to the 507th Maintenance Co. at An Nasiriyah was not simply the result what any individual soldier did or did not do on the field that day. Rather, I believe the tragedy was the end result of a reality of Army doctrine and culture that had been apparent to those of us in Combat Service Support many years prior to the ambush of the 507th on March 23, 2003. ... No combat formation commander ? whether at the company, battalion, brigade and certainly not division level ? wants to hear that their combat readiness report is suffering because some rag-tailed Ordnance unit and its commander decided to close the shops and do convoy and ambush reaction training.



4. Adequacy and Reliability of Weapons and Equipment



Even as the Pentagon celebrated the high-tech weapons that assured victory, DefenseWatch was reminding its readers that many other parts of the military are coming apart at the seams.



?Wanted: A Committee for the Protection of the Grunts,? Hackworth, DefenseWatch, Jan. 14, 2002



Then there's the CH-46 helicopter, a 40-year-old dinosaur held together by green duct tape, wire and Marine dedication. Not exactly the right stuff for the extreme dust and danger of Afghanistan. Why the Marines don't ground this accident-waiting-to-happen and borrow Blackhawks from non-deployed Army units is another one for the SecDef's list. The grunt's M-16A2 rifle has also been around since Vietnam, where our troops uniformly damned it. Updated, with most of the bugs ironed out, this 5.56 mm fly swatter still rates only average in reliability, functioning and grunt confidence. Given a choice, most Special Forces soldiers would go with the upgraded World War II Soviet AK-47. A top SF warrior with whom I shared a foxhole in Desert Storm says, "We have no doubt that come hell or high water, the AK won't let us down." The standard issue Beretta pistol is worse than a Saturday night special, while the "new" machine gun -- not much of an improvement on the World War I model that I had in my weapons squad in Korea! -- has been in use since 1962.



Combat in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed an inherent weakness in the standard bullet used by the troops ? a problem one DefenseWatch contributor noted had been identified 30 years ago in Vietnam ? and ignored.



?Lesson Unlearned - the Impotent Bullet,? by Anthony Milavic, DefenseWatch, June 26, 2002



For over 36 years, Americans on the field of battle have reported hitting enemy soldiers with multiple rounds of 5.56-mm. ammunition and watching them continue to advance while firing their weapons. In spite of these field observations, the DoD is developing its future infantry weapon - the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) - to fire this same impotent cartridge. ... On Apr. 4, 2002, I received an e-mail from a trooper in Afghanistan who appeals, in part: "The current-issue 62-gr 5.56-mm. (.223) round, especially when fired from the short-barreled M-4 carbine, is proving itself (once again) to be woefully inadequate as [a] man-stopper. Engagements at all ranges are requiring multiple, solid hits to permanently bring down enemy soldiers. Penetration is also sadly deficient. Even light barriers are not perforated by this rifle/cartridge combination."



Similarly, Col. Hackworth scooped the official ?lessons learned? reports from Afghanistan confirming the ineffectiveness of the M9 Beretta sidearm in combat with a column inspired by many emails he received from troops on the ground.



?An Open Letter to Members of Congress,? David H. Hackworth, DefenseWatch, July 10, 2002



Let's begin with the M-9, the 9-mm. Beretta pistol - which our combat troops say is the first item that should be tossed into the junk pile! "They're constantly breaking," reports a warrior from Afghanistan. "To make matters worse, the 9-mm. round is like firing paint balls. I had to pump four rounds into an al-Qaeda who was coming at me before he dropped. We're dealing with fanatical crazies out here who won't quit until they die for Allah."



And DefenseWatch was quick to reveal that the Pentagon planned to dump its remaining stocks of M-14 rifles despite their superior performance to the M-16.



?A Key Iraqi ?Lesson Learned? ? Keep the M-14,? Roger Moore, DefenseWatch, July 9, 2003



A key ?lesson learned? from Operation Iraqi Freedom and chronicled in the DefenseWatch Special Report: ?Small Arms and Individual Equipment Lessons Learned?, has been about firepower. The decades-old argument over the ineffectiveness of the ?Mighty Mattel,? as the M-16 was once known ? because of its composite plastic and aluminum handgrip stamped with the ?Mattel? logo when the rifles were first introduced ? has dramatically resurfaced almost 30 years after its introduction. ? Despite the obvious value of the M-14, the Pentagon in its corporate wisdom is about to get rid of its remaining stock of 300,000 M-14s.



5. Unmasking Waste and Abuse in Defense Spending



The pace of wartime operations led most news media outlets to focus on operational subjects such as unit deployments and combat. SFTT and DefenseWatch took time to focus on the unresolved issues of Pentagon spending priorities and a budget that cannot fund the plethora of new weapons and systems that the services want.



?The Hard Choices That We Can No Longer Ignore,? Ed Offley, DefenseWatch, Apr. 3, 2002


It was only 12 months ago, in early 2001 - that is, a hundred lifetimes and an entire historical era passed and gone - that I heard this astounding and revolutionary assertion from a pro-defense member of Congress as we discussed the future of the U.S. armed forces: "This is the year we finally have to make some hard choices." ... is genuinely puzzling and sad to read that Rumsfeld - who has prosecuted the war against terrorism far better than many could have imagined - is apparently ignoring the other serious threat to U.S. national security that he inherited a year ago: the ongoing deterioration and aging of the armed forces. ... If the Bush administration fails to address and correct the lurking defense crisis, two things will happen. First, we will inevitably experience multiple, deadly failures of U.S. military systems (whether training, operational or even in combat). Second, it will no longer be possible for the incumbent administration to blame anyone but itself for that tragedy.



The U.S. military?s antiquated personnel management works against military effectiveness in combat and is the direct cause of poor leadership and weak unit cohesion. DefenseWatch has been one of the few publications to examine how this ?invisible? issue has hindered the war on terrorism.



?Army Personnel System Stuck in the Wrong Century,? by Donald Vandergriff, DefenseWatch, Apr. 17, 2002



People are the most critical aspect of the country's national security, yet the current military personnel system is the most ignored aspect of reform. ? [The] personnel system plays a major role in defining whether the military force will be effective or ineffective. Why is it being ignored? The efficiency of the personnel system is immersed in management science, which has a hard time evaluating intangibles such as leadership, cohesion, morale and effectiveness because they are difficult to quantify. ... To have an officer corps built on men and women of strong character, you must give each officer an air of autonomy, the ability to make decisions and learn from mistakes. ? The current personnel system undermines this autonomy, so essential for winning effectively in combat.



?Seven Wars and a Century Later, a Failed System,? Donald Vandergriff, June 5, 2002



Once the Army began deploying ground combat units to Vietnam in 1965, it not only employed IRS to support them, but used an "infusion program" which destabilized units even more. It was the worst of all worlds: By inserting newly-arriving soldiers in deployed units, and by scattering soldiers with similar discharge or transfer dates from their unit to different ones, the Army successfully destroyed unit cohesion - the irreplaceable combination of esprit de corps and individual soldier morale critical to success in combat.



A DefenseWatch editor expert in military aviation design challenged the Pentagon?s ongoing campaign to develop the MV-22 Osprey



?Cost, Design Flaws Still Plague MV-22 Osprey,? Ralph Omholt, Oct. 23, 2002



Make no mistake about it, the MV-22 Osprey is not a revolutionary advancement in military aviation. It is, rather, a tax-dollar profiteering nightmare and a poorly conceptualized disaster in the making. ? The Osprey has another disadvantage - outrageous cost to develop, repair and replace. In 2000, the Congressional Research Service reported that the total cost of a proposed fleet of 458 Ospreys would be $38.1 billion, for a unit cost of $83.1 million per aircraft (the Marine Corps, using different accounting methods, has argued that the unit cost will be only $44 million per Osprey).



The overarching problem is that the fundamental design of the MV-22 clearly appears to be flawed. ? Despite official insistence earlier this year that the Osprey program has recovered from the two fatal crashes in 2000 and is entering a two-year testing program in good shape for production approval in 2006 or 2007, a number of questions remain unanswered about the Osprey design.



6. Defending Soldiers Victimized by the System



It is not only veterans who are being abused in terms of cuts in medical benefits. DefenseWatch revealed that even active-duty personnel were the victims of ?stealth? cuts.



(?Military Personnel Face a 'Shell Game' on Benefits,? Szelog, DefenseWatch, Feb. 20, 2002



Medical benefits are a perfect example of how benefits have been eroded, and a good example of the "We still have our benefits, we just have to pay for them now" word game that is going on. Military members are still fully covered for medical and dental expenses. However, in recent years, many installations have reduced their hospitals to cough-syrup-and-Motrin clinics that can only handle basic diagnosis, and treatment for things such as colds, the flu, etc. For anything more serious, or in many cases, for specialized services such as X-rays and labs, members either have to go to another base, or to a civilian hospital. Included with this reduction of hospitals to clinics, has been the closing of emergency facilities on bases. Beale Air Force Base, for example, which has an active flightline, a munitions-training school that uses live munitions, and a good-sized on-base population, has no emergency room today. The ambulances on base don't have paramedics, so all that can be done in an emergency is to stabilize a patient, and wait for a civilian ambulance. The nearest civilian hospital with an emergency room is 10 to 15 miles away, depending where on the base you are. This results in a total time of about 40-60 minutes to reach an emergency room.



DefenseWatch called public attention on one soldier?s struggle for justice in an abusive command.



?One Soldier's Victory Over 'Moral Rot' in Army,? by J. David Galland, DefenseWatch, Apr. 24, 2002



Master Sgt. Steve Croteau was a hell of a soldier and one of the finest and most dedicated military intelligence professionals I have ever met. ... Shortly after Croteau arrived at his assignment (a three-year tour), a junior soldier reported in from the 66th M.I. to operate some of the exclusive communication systems that were installed in the liaison office. This young specialist was not a particularly regimented soldier. He began exploiting his new, "non-garrison environment" in short order by breaking, and flaunting, German traffic laws. The violations required mandatory suspension of the young soldier's U.S. Army Europe driver's license and the possibility of severe disciplinary action to boot. However, the soldier's waywardness was not brought to the attention of his commander, but rather, to Steve and the civilian intelligence employee, who had diametrically opposed opinions when it came to punishing the slacker. ? The soldier went unpunished for his misconduct. This led Steve to make the fatal mistake in today's Army. He blew the whistle and demanded the truth and accountability. Croteau wrote to his chain of command in Augsburg, informing his superiors how his civilian boss, through a contact at the U.S. Army Headquarters in Heidelberg, had had the disciplinary action quashed.



DefenseWatch stepped in to shed light on the disgraceful treatment of two Army combat veterans of Afghanistan mistreated by their stateside administrative commander. Sources later said the publicity helped them win vindication and return to their unit.



?Exonerated on Battlefield, Shafted by Headquarters,? Ed Offley, DefenseWatch, Aug. 14, 2002



Praised by their superiors for excellent performance, and formally exonerated by an Army Safety Board investigation that found the fatal explosion the result of "combat action," the unit returned to its base in San Diego in early June grieving their lost comrades but satisfied that they had carried out their duties honorably and well. Then the bombshell: Col. Kathleen Meehan, commander of the 52nd Ordnance Group based at Fort Gillem, Ga., announced her intention to relieve Nelson and Albritton from their command positions, using an administrative (rather than judicial) procedure that offered the two soldiers neither due process nor even a detailed explanation for the drastic action. Since then, the two men have lingered in an administrative limbo.



Sources close to the two soldiers say the most likely reason for Meehan's move is because of her reaction to the fatal ammunition explosion - even though the Army field investigation cleared them of any culpability or wrongdoing.



?After Months of Limbo, Good News for Two Soldiers,? Ed Offley, DefenseWatch, Sept. 25, 2002



This may seem like small change compared with the momentous events of today ? the steady move toward war with Iraq, the unending hunt for al Qaeda terrorists, the contentious issues of military transformation ? but something truly uplifting recently occurred in the U.S. Army. The system worked. ... Six weeks later, the AR 15-6 investigation has concluded by formally exonerating the two soldiers once more, according to Forces Command spokesman Barry Morris. ?The [AR] 15-6 found no problems with discipline or methods in the unit that warranted their removal,? Morris told DefenseWatch. ?Capt. Nelson and 1st Sgt. Albritton can stay in their current positions as commanding officer and first sergeant of the 710th Ordnance Co.?



7. Maltreatment of Veterans



DefenseWatch helped disclose new details of a Cold War-era secret biological agent testing program that had harmed hundreds of Navy personnel and a policy to deny them any treatment or assistance.



?Project SHAD: Lesson from a Secret Experiment,? Robert G. Williscroft, DefenseWatch, Apr. 10, 2002



Project SHAD: Shipboard Hazard and Defense ... was part of the joint service chemical and biological warfare test program, whose tests were designed to "identify US warships' vulnerabilities to attacks with chemical or biological warfare agents and to develop procedures to respond to such attacks while maintaining a war-fighting capability .... " But as the Pentagon and other federal agencies race to develop defenses against the threat from chemical and biological warfare attacks, the emergence of a long-hidden military experimentation program - which used unwitting military servicemen as guinea pigs - offers a cautionary warning about the need for honesty and candor in the ongoing effort. ? The sailor said that on four or five occasions during the next few weeks in the North Atlantic, an American military jet over flew the ship. Minutes later a mist descended. "Some of us were inside the ship," another sailor recalled, "but most of us were outside when the stuff came down."



?Secret Tests May Have Harmed Over 2,000 Sailors,? by Robert G. Williscroft, DefenseWatch, Apr. 24, 2002



The Project [SHAD] designers moved the basis away from presumed biologically neutral markers and simulants to employ real biologically active bacteria and actual deadly toxins. ... It appears ? that the bean counters decided the cost was too high, especially since the projected test materials were actually benign anyway. Consequently, the NBC garb never made it into the final protocols. ... Using a 1960s-era edition of Jane's Fighting Ships, it appears that the tests involved over 2,000 sailors serving aboard the seven ships and five tugs.





DefenseWatch helped warn veterans of a 2002 massive identity theft alert:



?Identity Thieves Harvesting DD-214s From Courthouse Records,? Andrea West, DefenseWatch, Feb. 13. 2002.



It was one of the last pieces of advice I received while preparing to leave active duty. "Take your DD-214 down to the county courthouse and register it," my first sergeant said. "That way, if you lose the hard copy you can replace it easily." It seemed like wise advice at the time - since it can be very difficult to replace a lost DD-214 form - but filing your formal discharge document with a local courthouse can make you extremely vulnerable to an even more serious problem: identity theft. ? You cannot underestimate the hazard of someone obtaining your DD-214. A DD-214 is an identity document. It links a Social Security number to a name, and makes it simple for an identity thief to connect the dots.



As the debate over ?concurrent receipt? heated up in 2002, DefenseWatch helped lead the charge to grant disabled veterans the same rights as other federal retirees.



?The Time Has Come for ?Concurrent Receipt?,? Matthew Dodd, DefenseWatch, Oct. 2, 2002



Anyone who picks up the basic Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 2002 benefits pamphlet (Federal Benefits for Veterans and Dependents) will notice on its cover an inspiring quote from retired Army Gen. Omar Bradley, the nation?s VA administrator during 1945-47: ?We are dealing with veterans, not procedures, with their problems, not ours.? It is in the spirit of Bradley?s words that veterans organizations and their allies in Congress are defying Pentagon and White House opposition to a very important issue, concurrent receipt.



For those unfamiliar with this topic, a quick review of concurrent receipt. Under a century-old law, military retirees entitled to VA disability payments must forfeit a dollar-for-dollar portion of their retirement pay equal to their disability pay. Receiving both payments is known as ?concurrent receipt.? ... Military retirees are the only retirees from any sector who must forfeit one dollar of their retired pay for each dollar of VA disability compensation awarded. For some, the forfeiture cancels all retired pay earned, thus forcing those retirees to fund their own retirement.